



Version of attached le:
Accepted Version
Peer-review status of attached le:
Peer-reviewed
Citation for published item:
Chen, Hung-Ying (2020) 'Cashing in on the sky: nancialization and urban air rights in the Taipei
Metropolitan Area.', Regional Studies., 54 (2). pp. 198-208.
Further information on publisher's website:
https://doi.org/10.1080/00343404.2019.1599104
Publisher's copyright statement:




The full-text may be used and/or reproduced, and given to third parties in any format or medium, without prior permission or charge, for
personal research or study, educational, or not-for-prot purposes provided that:
• a full bibliographic reference is made to the original source
• a link is made to the metadata record in DRO
• the full-text is not changed in any way
The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright holders.
Please consult the full DRO policy for further details.
Durham University Library, Stockton Road, Durham DH1 3LY, United Kingdom












Hung-Ying Chen, Department of Geography, Durham University, Durham, UK 
Corresponding author: Hung-Ying Chen, Science Laboratories, Durham University, South Rd, 













This paper focuses on urban air rights, property rights for the ownership, development and trading 
of the airspace above land parcels. A three-fold contribution is made to the study of urban 
financialization. First, urban air rights are explicated as a new empirical terrain for research into 
urban financialization. Second, air rights are conceptualized as ‘market devices’ that enable market-
making processes and are deployed by an activist state to facilitate regulatory and socio-technical 
conditions for urban financialization. Third, case studies of urban Taipei show air rights take subtly 
different forms across financialized processes of infrastructure provision and urban renewal. 
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Against the backdrop of rapid urbanization and vertical sprawl in Middle Eastern and Asian cities 
(Elinoff, Sur, & Yeoh, 2017), this paper focuses on the advance of urban air rights in the Taipei 
Metropolitan Area (TMA). Broadly understood, the creation and trading of rights to the air include 
aviation rights (Lin, 2016) and perhaps also carbon emission rights (Knox-Hayes, 2013). The air 
rights that concern this paper, however, are in the realm of urban processes, namely virtual property 
rights that enable the ownership, development and trading of the airspace above land parcels 
(Goldschmidt, 1964). A focus on urban air rights clearly chimes with research that, frustrated by the 
‘flat geography’ derived from a top-down cartographic gaze (Graham, 2016), seeks to study what is 
variously described as ‘vertical’, ‘volumetric’ and ‘aerial urbanism’ (Adey, 2013; Harris, 2015; 
McNeill, 2009). However, this paper is primarily concerned with relations between urban air rights 
and the financialization of the built environment. Air rights would certainly seem to figure in the socio-
material and vertical transformations of con- temporary urban landscapes wherein high-rises and sky- 
scrapers are physical manifestations of financialization (Weber, 2010, 2015). However, to constitute 
what we understand to be the defining feature of processes of financialization (O’Neill, 2018), this 
necessarily requires that urban air rights come to feature, in the first instance, in financial market 
circuits that variously fund private capital investments in and extract value from the built environment. 
 
The existing literature addressing the financialization of urban processes typically highlights how 
specific types of commodified urban space become asset classes in global investment portfolios. 
Often focusing on built environments in Anglo-American post-industrial societies (Christophers, 
2012; Fields, 2018; French, Leyshon, & Wainwright, 2011), what unites these asset classes is  their 
anticipated income streams and prospective rents that can be bundled together and leveraged in the 
present to raise debt finance for investment. The entry point for studying the ‘urban–financial nexus’ 
was initially and largely residential mortgages (Harvey, 1974), and more recently subprime 
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residential mortgages in the United States and Europe (Aalbers, 2012; Langley, 2008). Subsequent 
research in the wake of the global financial crisis has expanded this remit to include the role of 
private finance and financial instruments in the rental housing sector (Fields & Uffer, 2016); 
commercial property market (Crosby & Henneberry, 2016); mega-urban development projects 
(Guironnet, Attuyer, & Halbert, 2015); and the securitization of prospective property taxes 
(Pacewicz, 2016). However, if we broaden our analytical horizons to consider the proliferation of 
related financial instruments and asset classes, and shift geographical focus to processes of 
urbanization in the Middle East and Asia, a further feature of the contemporary financialization of 
the built environment becomes apparent: the role of urban air rights above the space of the city. While 
mortgages, securitization techniques, etc. have been found to imbue urban processes with financial 
market rationales, logic and practices else- where in the world, in Asian and Middle Eastern cities 
the socio-technical operations of urban air rights would appear to play a similar role in the 
financialization of the built environment. 
 
To elaborate upon the workings of urban air rights in the urban–finance nexus, this paper draws on 
aspects of fieldwork conducted between 2014 and 2017 in the TMA, including Taipei City and New 
Taipei City. As part of the broader project that researched the emergence and proliferation of urban 
air rights in the TMA from the 1990s to the present, the fieldwork comprised archival documentary 
research and analysis, semi-structured inter- views, and focus groups. The archival research analyzed 
a range of policy and project reports that, for example, laid the foundations for the two case studies 
presented below. A total of 38 semi-structured interviews were undertaken with market 
intermediaries (i.e., broker-dealers, planners, appraisers and redevelopers) and government officials, 
and three focus groups were conducted with local residents and industry professionals. The 
development of the second case study presented in this paper was greatly assisted by one of the 





This paper makes a three-fold contribution to extant geographical research into urban 
financialization. First, and most obviously, it initiates an enquiry into urban air rights as a new 
empirical terrain for geographical research. This is consistent with the recent broadening of 
financialization research noted above, and opens up a consideration of financialization processes that 
attempt to ‘cash in on the sky’ and operate above and beyond (but not separate from) related property 
markets and urban infrastructure projects. Accordingly, the next section provides a brief introduction 
to urban air rights, especially as they take the slightly different forms of bonus air rights, offsets and 
permits. All these forms of air rights are found in the Taiwanese context and, in particular, in this 
paper’s case studies of the TMA, wherein multiple applications of urban air rights are identified as 
operating within three policy-making instruments: bonus floor area (BFA), transferable development 
rights (TDR) and incremental floor area (IFA). 
 
The second contribution is conceptual. At the intersection of political economy and cultural 
economy approaches to urban financialization, there is particular interest in the significance of the 
workings of a range of various provisions and apparatuses (e.g., legal, planning, socio-technical) to 
processes of change (e.g., Langley, 2018; O’Neill, 2013; van Loon & Aalbers, 2017). Such provisions 
and apparatuses are typically understood to come to the fore as state policy is reoriented towards the 
leverage of private finance and the making of assets in support of urban processes (O’Neill, 2018). 
As outlined below, urban air rights are conceptualized as ‘market devices’ (Muniesa, Millo, & Callon, 
2007) to foreground both their multiple operations in processes of market-making and their 
deployment as a pol- icy instrument by an activist state seeking to facilitate the necessary legal, 
regulatory and sociotechnical conditions for advancing and deepening urban financialization 
processes (O’Neill, 2013). The critical utility of ‘market devices’ in this respect is held to turn on its 
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capacity to hold together the amorphous and multifaceted qualities of urban air rights across multiple 
markets and urban policy interventions. Air rights are devices that make possible commodified and 
volumetric ownership claims simultaneously in primary urban property markets by various 
stakeholders; the secondary trading of marketized rights to build by urban redevelopers and investors; 
and the leverage of debt against portfolios of volumetric assets which are capitalized upon because 
they are deemed capable of yielding a future revenue stream. 
 
The third contribution is more analytical. As the final section shows, illustrated by two extended 
case studies from the TMA, air rights as market devices take subtly different forms when deployed 
in the urban projects of activist state policy. As the case studies demonstrate, the specific forms air 
rights take are important to how their operations facilitate processes of financialization across urban 
infrastructure and housing projects. Taipei arguably exemplifies global tendencies presently shared 
amongst cities wherein financialized urban processes are manifest in high-rise building booms, 
largely decoupled from local demands for affordable housing and infrastructure. Large-scale and 
fast-paced high-rise building construction has incited a series of environmental and societal concerns. 
What begins to be revealed through the analysis of the case studies, however, are the diverse ways in 
which the workings of air rights as market devices contribute to disrupting the so-called property 
cycle and sustaining the decade-long vertical property boom of urban Taipei. The analytical 
contribution of the paper thereby underscores wider calls for geographical analyses of 
financialization to be sensitive to spatial variegations as it moves beyond Anglo-American 
heartlands (Christophers, 2012). Air rights in the TMA have all made cashing in on the sky possible, 
but have been variously configured as market devices for financialized public infrastructure 
provision and private residential renewal. 
 
URBAN AIR RIGHTS 
 
7  
Urban air rights refer to the right to build, own, use and decide upon the appropriation of the vertical 
space above a designated tract of land. The legal concept of air rights was initially based on the Latin 
legal maxim Cujus est solum, ejus est usque ad caelum, meaning ‘for whoever owns the soil, owns 
the sky’ (Goldschmidt, 1964). It is derived from English Common Law and was first laid  out through 
the institutional planning practice of the zoning system that specifies the type and density of land use 
of each zone across a city (Marcus, 1984). Set within the zoning systems, urban air rights typically 
detach the right to build upwards from the underlying and designated surface use of the terra firma. 
 
The earliest urban air rights on record were created with the redesign and redevelopment of New York 
Central Terminal, completed in 1913 (Noble, Noble, & Costa, 1993). According to Goldschmidt 
(1964), the urban air rights created in relation to New York Central Terminal were detached and 
subsequently exercised in the building of 18 skyscrapers along Park Avenue through to 1929. It was 
not until after 1945, however, that urban air rights began to be extensively created as part of urban 
development in the United States. It was also during this period that urban air rights travelled across 
the globe, packaged into policy instruments as part of technical advice in urban planning programs. 
 
Through this mechanism of policy transfer, urban air rights found their way into the modern urban 
planning system in Taiwan. Under the Kuomintang (KMT, Nationalist Party) regime, local 
Taiwanese bureaucrats collaborated with technical advisory groups from the United Nations and 
USAID to adopt North American zoning techniques into the Taiwanese urban planning system. The 
current three-dimensional planning system can thus be dated to the 1964 Urban Planning Act. 
Between the 1960s and 1990s, urban Taipei experienced four property cycles. However, it was the 
over-a-decade-long property cycle between 2002 and the mid-2010s that coincided with the marked 
and considerable expansion of the air rights economy in urban Taipei. In 2015, the World Bank 
published a research report entitled East Asia’s Changing Urban Landscape: Measuring a Decade of 
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Spatial Growth (2015), which listed Taiwan as having the second highest pro- portion of urban land 
(5.3%) just behind the city-state of Singapore. Regarding the pace of new urban construction, Taiwan 
is again listed as the second highest new urban construction per capita (260 m2), which only fell behind 
Laos (280 m2) during the period 2000–10. While these statistics may not precisely reflect the 
expansion of urban airspace in urban Taipei, Figure 1 further uses building usage license data to show 
that the proportion of high-rise buildings above 30 m within the total new buildings have significantly 
increased since 2002. This was the period in which the activist state developed a proliferating array 
of policy interventions that mobilized air rights to unlock private finance for urban development and 
renewal. While a full review of the property cycles of Taipei is beyond the scope of this paper, how 
longstanding provisions for urban air rights have come to the fore in the most recent property cycle 
is key to understanding their role in the financialization of Taipei’s urban built environment. 
 
Once separated from their underlying land parcel, urban air rights are widely recognized by urban 
planners to take the forms of bonus air rights, offsets and permits (Table 1). Each is generated 
differently and enables different economic mechanisms and practices, but each can also be combined 
with specific urban policy initiatives and applied to particular locations. Bonus air rights in Taiwan 
take the form of a BFA, a planning instrument known as a floor area ratio (FAR) bonus in some US 
and Japanese cities and as a bonus plot ratio in the UK, Australia and Hong Kong. Offset air rights 
in Taiwan are chiefly TDR, which is also a common category of urban air rights elsewhere. Finally, 
air rights in their permit form are mainly known as IFA in Taiwan, a policy instrument established in 








Mechanisms Properties Forms Purposes for Planning Findings 
Bonus Floor 
Area (BFA) 
- Area-based, one-off, non-
transferable air right; 
- Transaction only occurs in the 
package of project ownerships 




- Fungible for Urban Policies 
(e.g. building qualities and 
socially-oriented 
service/amenity provisions)  
- Rebuilding Subsidy 
- The expansion of BFA credits/coupons is 
reinforced by its stretched items of exchange and 




Rights (TDR)  
- Directly tradable, mobile and 
divisible air rights; 
- Transferable by contracts and 




Offset credits for compensating 
property rights restrained by (1) 
historic preservation; (2) natural 
conservation; and (3) urban 
public infrastructure projects 
- The expansion of TDR credits is evolved with, 
and emerges through, the increasing reliance on 
market-based instruments for debt relay.  
- TDR and their derivative features allow 
hedging, arbitraging and speculating investments 




- Area-based, non-transferable 
air rights; 




Public debt instrument  - The inception of IFA credits mimics the 
rationale of BFA and TDR as a value capturing 
instrument for infrastructural financing  
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Bonus floor area (BFA) 
BFA is a market-based incentive mechanism that rewards developers who either comply with a 
design standard or provide public facilities. It is a non-transferable air right issued by market 
intermediaries at the discretion of local public authorities. Associated with a project on the 
underlying site, BFA entitles the developer to build additional floor area on the same site and is only 
transferable in the context of overall project ownership. In Taiwan, BFA became incorporated into 
comprehensive planning after 1983, and was typically used as part of planning and construction of 
parking lots between 1995 and 2011. Subsequent to the global financial crisis, however, BFA has 
been more widely used as an incentive to accelerate urban redevelopment programs across a range 
of planning policies in Taiwan. In the TMA, for example, this includes the conservation and 
maintenance of historic buildings, the construction of energy-efficient and ‘greener’ buildings of all 
types, and the creation of private open spaces within residential and commercial complexes. Across 
these myriad and multiple applications, BFA may range between 10% and 50% of the legal floor 
area of the underlying land parcel. In short, the prolific application of BFA is now often legitimated 
on the grounds that it assists planners and policymakers in addressing social and environmental 
needs more widely.1  
 
Transferable development rights (TDR) 
TDR are a market-based offset tool that allows the urban air rights created in relation to one site to 
be moved and exercised at another site. They are the creation of intermediary institutions and land 
brokers who identify potential land parcels that meet the requisite conditions of local regulations. 
Moreover, for TDR to be redeemed as officially authorized permits, they are first traded as offset 
credits through various secondary market arrangements that can include public auctions (Vejchodská, 
                                                     
1 Confidential interviews with three officials from New Taipei City government, November 9 and 13, 2015. 
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2016), stock exchanges (Sandroni, 2010) and private markets (Shih, Chiang, Chang, & Chang, 2017). 
This also introduces a speculative character to TDR that is not present in other urban air rights, or 
indeed their application in theories of urban planning. 
 
The initial adoption of TDR globally sought to mitigate trade-offs between development and 
conservation, spreading worldwide from the 1980s (Renard, 2007). TDR were first introduced into 
Taiwan in 1996 as part of cultural conservation programs. Thereafter, TDR were integrated more 
broadly into local government attempts to build and renew urban infrastructures across Taiwan. In 
the TMA, for example, local governments tend to compensate landowners who are subject to zoning 
and acquisition restrictions on their right to development with regulations that facilitate the creation 
of TDR. Secondary markets for TDR in Taiwan are characterized, moreover, by trading operations 
of arbitrage and future-oriented pricing strategies imbued with a derivative logic. Prices for TDR 
are typically arrived at in relation to the prices of other similar asset classes instead of underlying 






Figure 1. Nationwide building usage licence by height, 1993–2015. 




The third, emerging type of urban air rights is the permit form. Akin to BFA, permits are an urban 
air right that is non-transferable and remains affixed to the underlying site. Unlike BFA, however, 
permits are issued by local municipalities and sold to developers in order to build additional floor 
area on the same site, typically in the immediate surrounding area of a public infrastructure project. 
Permits are the most recent form of urban air rights, only emerging sporadically worldwide after the 
2008 global financial crisis. In the TMA, urban air rights as permits are known as IFA, but this form 
does not have a common name globally. Local governments in Taiwan are authorized to sell such 
permits that are ear- marked for urban infrastructural financing. Moreover, in the TMA, a building 





URBAN AIR RIGHTS AND FINANCIALIZATION: MARKET DEVICES 
To begin to understand the ways in which urban air rights facilitate multiple and related processes of 
primary and secondary marketization and financialization, it seems appropriate to conceptualize them 
as ‘market devices’ (Muniesa et al., 2007). The concept of market devices emerged in response to 
cultural economists’ concerns with the socio-technical tools and techniques mobilized in processes 
of market-making. It refers to ‘a wide array of objects’ that are material and/or discursive in character 
and which variously constitute processes of market-making through their operations (Callon & 
Muniesa, 2005). Put differently, conceptualizing air rights as market devices allows one to explore 
them as ‘objects with agency’ in market-making processes (Muniesa et al., 2007). 
 
Conceptualizing urban air rights as market devices also has the added benefit of productively 
connecting understandings of air rights with the growing body of research across political and 
cultural economy approaches that is particularly interested in the significance of the workings of 
various provisions and apparatuses (e.g., legal, planning, socio-technical) to processes of urban 
financialization (e.g., Langley, 2018; O’Neill, 2013; van Loon & Aalbers, 2017). Such provisions and 
apparatuses are typically understood to come to the fore as state policy is re-orientated towards the 
leverage of private finance and the making of assets in sup- port of urban processes (O’Neill, 2018). 
This includes, for example, research that addresses how policy instruments that are repurposed into 
debt instruments (e.g., Klink & Stroher, 2017) and calculative tools of valuation refigure landed 
property and urban infrastructure as financial assets and investment vehicles (Allen & Pryke, 2013; 
O’Neill, 2018). Crucial to connecting urban air rights to this research, however, is the extension of the 
concept of market devices to refer to both their multiple operations in market- making processes and 
their deployment as a policy instrument by an activist state seeking to facilitate the necessary legal, 
regulatory, and socio-technical conditions for advancing and deepening urban financialization 
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processes (O’Neill, 2013). Urban air rights, then, are conceptualized here as market devices to centre 
analytical attention on their dual workings: policy instruments as economic mechanisms, on the one 
hand, and their products that take legal–economic forms, on the other. 
 
Mechanisms 
Urban air rights constitute three related processes of marketization that can be understood as both 
analytically and empirically distinct – commodification (also known as primary marketization), 
marketization (the secondary marketization of rights to build) and capitalization. Jane Jacobs’s 
observation on cities and economies is an informative heuristic here for understanding how the 
concept of market devices advances an understanding of urban financialization as manifold 
marketization processes. Financialization is thus a process that ‘put[s] old goods and services to new 
uses’ and ‘employ[s] them in new combinations of work’ (Jacobs, 1970, p. 68). In this case, urban 
financialization actually entails the combination of multiple marketization processes at once. 
 
First, commodification is the elemental process reframing urban airspace as volumetric property that 
can be claimed and owned. Specific socio-technical arrangements are facilitated through the 
selective presence and absence of the state, whereas urban policy and regulatory frameworks lay the 
foundation for market intermediaries to create, measure and quantify air rights commodities, and the 
state holds discretionary power to (in)validating the right to build, access, obtain and control the 
urban airspace. In Taipei, the processes of converting urban air into volumetric property ownership 
are variously legally authorized by local governments and refigured into building credits that are 
attached to or detachable from a designated site. The three-dimensional trope of property ownership 
unsettles the established physical structure and its claims, collapses abstract and physical urban 
spaces, and expands the resembled space into a malleable frontier for diversified and complex sets 
of ownership claims. This is crucial to the fungible quality of urban air rights, as ownership claims 
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by urban developers may, for example, be appropriated by financial investors and thus transformed 
into an asset class (Muniesa et al., 2017). 
 
Second, urban air rights also make possible processes of marketization wherein ownership claims on 
the urban sky are bought and sold through a series of secondary market arrangements, most notably 
the TDR market. In urban Taipei, air rights are made available on demand via either offset credits 
circulated in secondary markets or permits sold in governmental platforms. For instance, offset 
credits and their secondary trading in Taipei are predominantly processed by market intermediaries. 
Thereby, air rights are not merely stockpiled onto development sites but also generated through 
market practices – from site scouting to anchoring, trading, slicing and assembling. Con- sider that 
redevelopment projects are reformulated into the investment portfolio of air rights. Such portfolios 
are core to launch capitalization, which will be argued below. Secondary marketization of air rights, 
in essence, is critical to unveiling the ways in which air rights ‘unlock’ urban land value and become 
an investment channel in their own right. 
 
Third, once urban air rights are assembled as volumetric assets in investment portfolios, they further 
evolve in processes of capitalization. They are borrowed against in the present for purposes of urban 
(re)development project loans and hedging risks of overbuilding. Capitalization is key to urban 
financialization as it captures the qualitative change of air rights from an investable object into an  
asset that potentially yields a future revenue stream (Muniesa et al., 2017). It is also a critical process 





To substantiate how air rights are shaping three-dimensional ownership claims and implicating 
property relations, this section now looks at the three forms of building credits they take: bonus, offsets 
and permits. 
 
Urban air rights take the form of bonus credits that pro- vide incentives for redevelopers to equip 
their building practices with concerns of socio-environmental mitigation (i.e., the provision of public 
facilities, green architecture and housing resettlement). Redevelopers acquire bonus credits through 
government-based planning reviews. These building credits are increasingly used to replace physical 
property for collateralized borrowing by pitching redevelopment into project finance. In so doing, air 
rights become building credits for the redeveloper and related property owners to draw down funding 
and repay at a later date. 
 
Moreover, building credits in forms of offsets and permits are cast as the emerging resource terrain 
for value capture finance that is mobilized to support both state-led public infrastructure and urban 
redevelopment projects (Gandhi & Phatak, 2016). The difference between offsets and permits, then, 
appears in its platform of circulation. Offset credits are traded between brokerages and investors, 
whereas permits are issued through the primary market facilitated by the state. They share the same 
motive that air rights are morphed into building credits so that the fiscal expenditure and compensation 
for public services and facilities could substitute money compensation. The credibility of building 
credits is built upon the future income streams promised by the fluid careers of air rights – a cheaper 
alternative of investment into purchasing and developing urban land parcels. 
 
While (re)development activities increasingly emphasize pursuing the expansion and circulation of 
building credits, these forms of building credits are analytically important because they reveal the 
 
17  
asset-making processes and unsettle the very politics of redistribution. Essentially, building credits 
are the nitty-gritty to enlarge the vertical territory of ownership claims. While techniques of 
assembling building credits redefine the core of redevelopers’ profession in ‘unlocking’ potential land 
value, property owners were encouraged to offer their own land capital in order to acquire the growth 
of ownership claims. As such, the redistribution of building credits emerges not only as the object of 
dispute in urban politics but also as the spatial–financial registers that redistribute agencies. In this 
trope, air rights in various forms are also spatial ‘things’ that, as Ç alışkan and Callon (2009) put it, 
travel and develop their own socioeconomic ‘careers’. 
 
CASHING IN ON THE SKY OF URBAN TAIPEI 
Urban air rights as market devices are presently mobilized in numerous and context-specific ways 
across cities experiencing rapid vertical sprawl. This section examines how they are currently being 
mobilized in relatively specific socio-technical market practices and urban policy initiatives in the 
TMA. Specifically, the focus is on two concrete and ongoing instances to stress the diverse and 
relatively discrete forms that air rights can take. The first example is a policy initiative centring on a 
transport infrastructure project; the second is a residential housing renewal project. In the first, urban 
air rights as market devices primarily take the form of permits (IFAs), and are critical to constituting 
the commodification and state-led capitalization processes underpinning the construction and 
operation of the Greater Taipei subway system. The second exhibits how urban air rights are 
capitalized in the assembly of bonus (BFA) and offsets (TDR). In this instance, air rights are crucial 
to urban vertical sprawl and also facilitate private capitalization processes. 
 
The Greater Taipei subway system 
Plans to extend the Greater Taipei subway system to incorporate the newly established administrative 
area of New Taipei City – a new municipal city of 4 million inhabitants were first unveiled in 2010 
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as part of Mayor Chu Li- Lun’s election campaign. The planned extension – often shorthanded as 
an additional ‘three rings and three lines’ sought to add 174 new metro stations to the Greater Taipei 
subway system and increase the total track length by 209.81 km. 
 
Public transit systems are well known as capital intensive and marked by long-term investment and 
low revenue yields. They are, in short, an unwieldy object of financing (Ashton, Doussard, & Weber, 
2016; O’Neill, 2013). How- ever, funding the construction and operation of the planned expansion of 
the Greater Taipei subway system posed a particular set of problems for the New Taipei City 
government, which, in fiscal crisis, was also required by central government to operate within 
tightened public funding parameters. The New Taipei City government’s public debt doubled during 
the five-year period from 2011  (New Taipei City Government, 2017). At the same time, central 
government public spending parameters – figured by the Cross-fields Value-adding Public 
Infrastructure Financial Planning legislation of 2012 – set the minimum local public finance ratio at 
30% and encouraged local municipalities to embrace new financial instruments to raise capital, most 
notably, tax increment financing (TIF) mechanisms and various land-based instruments, discussed in 
detail below. Moreover, to access any public investment by central government in the subway system 
extension, the New Taipei City government was required to make a bid to a competitive process under 
the terms of the Frontier Infrastructure Plan of 2017, which proved unsuccessful. 
 
Confronted by local fiscal crisis and new central govern- ment requirements, the New Taipei City 
government established a dedicated fund (New Taipei City Track Construction Development 
Fund) in 2011 for the planned Greater Taipei subway system extension. While the fund received 
some city government cash in the form of revenues redirected from other similar funds, the principal 
purpose of the fund was to explore a range of funding solutions. As expressed by the city 
government’s Auditing Office,  this was to be a transition from an ‘operation fund’ to a ‘capital 
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plan’ (Lee, 2015). Such a shift is a common feature of the financialization of urban infrastructure, 
which entails a subtle change from funding to financing. As explained by O’Brien and Pike (2017, p. 
224), ‘funding sources for infra- structure … tend to be derived from taxation, user fees or other 
charges’, while ‘financing refers to the financial models that organize how the revenue (or funding) 
sources are turned into capital’ (see also Langley, 2018). However, what is especially notable about 
the planned extension to the Greater Taipei subway system is that the shift to finance and a ‘capital 
plan’ came to involve the mobilization of urban air rights as market devices. 
 
The urban air rights in question were part of the planning paradigm of transport-oriented development 
(TOD) that, in textbooks, provides a finance model for green trans- port projects. Intriguingly, in the 
case of the Greater Taipei subway system extension, TOD was used as a rhetorical tool through which 
a host of urban air rights were created on land parcels adjoining to and in the vicinity of the planned 
public transit facilities. In the first instance, potential sites of new development were identified near 
the public infrastructure. Changes to zoning codes elevated the buildable volumes on each site, such 
that urban air rights could be created by local government and sold in the form of IFA permits. Here, 
air rights as market devices are employed to draw out the private sector to pay for new transport 
infrastructure, and advanced in enacting an investment scenario of volumetric ownership. 
 
Moreover, for the identified potential sites of redevelopment, developers also already had the option 
of exploring possibilities with intermediaries for the creation of further and additional bonus and 
offset forms of urban   air rights (i.e., BFA and TDR). As such, the application of TOD in the Greater 
Taipei subway system extension was part of the local government effort to generate revenues by re-
channeling developers into purchasing an IFA permit, responding to the relatively extensive use of 
BFA and TDR across the urban landscape of the TMA since the mid-1990s. Nonetheless, IFAs 
remain a relatively unattractive option for developers, as IFAs are relatively expensive ownership 
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claims on the air that have to be priced and purchased from the local government such that they can 
later be exercised by developers. In contrast, BFA and TDR are forms of air rights that, as market 
devices, are either free under local government regulations or relatively cheap to buy from specialist 
intermediaries.2  
 
For air rights to operate as market devices and to play a constitutive role in the state-led capitalization 
of the Greater Taipei subway system extension, the New Taipei City government created a staged 
development plan that designates the sale of IFAs as a revenue stream for each of the multiple zones 
adjoining the subway system. It is these prospective revenue streams that the New Taipei City Track 
Construction Development Fund primarily uses for the sake of leveraging debt to finance investment 
in the subway system extension. In short, the local government pitches their fiscal projection by selling 
tranches of air rights in the form of permits to developers. In the terms of the government report (New 
Taipei City Government, 2014) on the feasibility of IFAs as an instrument of  urban policy, the 
revenue streams captured from selling IFAs are calculated by dividing the annuities of the zones 
released in earlier stages against the total buildable zones that will be released in the planned timeline. 
The report then predicts a total income stream of NT$6.9 billion to be generated solely by selling 
IFAs – a number exceeding NT$4 billion, the fund’s 2014 annual budget. 
 
Despite concerns of environmental degradation raised by the planning department (New Taipei City 
Government, 2015), urban air rights were still mobilized for the Greater Taipei subway system 
extension. They were essentially imagined as an effective market device, and urban policy mobilized 
air rights as an active infrastructure funding vehicle. In the terms of local government, this was a 
matter of making the densification of adjoining and surrounding land ‘a value-capture tool for metro 
                                                     
2  Confidential interviews with a focus group made up of five participants who are developers and assembling experts, 
January 4, 2016. 
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infrastructure’ (New Taipei City Government, 2014). It was also clearly a response to the expectation 
of the central state that local states should adopt a neoliberal ethics of ‘self-sufficiency’ into their 
‘anticipatory fiscal plan’ (Lai & Su, 2013, p.54). While constituting processes of commodification 
and capitalization, urban air rights in their IFA form were also instrumental to altering the logic of 
governance and exemplified the neoliberal shift from funding to financing. 
 
Residential renewal for the Da-Chen Community 
The Da-Chen Righteous Compatriot Community (Da- Chen, for short), adjacent to the Xin-Dian 
River in Taipei City, is an immigrant neighborhood in the northern Yonghe district of New Taipei 
City (Figure 2). Da-Chen has been cast by the local government as a ‘blight’ settlement. Amidst the 
highly populated Yonghe district, which has an average of 40,000 inhabitants/km2, Da- Chen is 
home to 1500 households in an 8.2-hectare site, whereby 75% of the households live in rented 
tenement housing, replete with makeshift alterations. 
 
Though the New Taipei City government has prioritized Da-Chen on its renewal agenda for many 
years, achieving a redevelopment that would transition the housing tenure of the population in the 
area from informal settlers to owner-occupiers has proven problematic. Developers were 
discouraged by the financial circumstances of the majority of inhabitants, socioeconomic minorities 
who were typically unable to access mortgage finance. On several occasions, government tenders for 
the private redevelopment of Da-Chen failed to attract interest. In response, the city government set 
up a staged development plan for Da-Chen, dividing it into seven subzones and relaxing zoning 
restrictions on the potential building volume. Zone 2, discussed in detail below, was prioritized as 
an exemplary case that uses air rights to prompt a more positive response from would-be developers. 
 
A local developer, Kei-Shen Construction, bid for the tender to renew housing in Zone 2, an area of 
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180 house- holds mainly living in housing of between two and four floors. Between 2011 and 2016, 
Kei-Shen Construction transformed Zone 2 in Da-Chen, which came to comprise 703 housing units 
across three 29-floor residential towers, 724 car parking spaces and 708 motorcycle parking spaces. 
At first, this remarkable volumetric growth would seem to have been a result of the discretion of local 
planning administrators: the statutory cap of 300% buildable volume that applied to Zone 2 was raised 
to a total of 663.29%. However, such planning provisions also significantly demonstrated the agency 
of urban air rights that could mobilize the redeveloper and fellow investors in the course of the project. 
On the underlying land of Zone 2, Kei-Shen Construction was able to deliver a blended portfolio of 
volumetric assets that assembled building credits in both their BFA and TDR forms. Additionally, 
the volumetric growth is skillfully pitched at an accurate 29-floor height because once a building is 
designed above 30 floors, the project will be subject to an environmental impact assessment. 
 
Kei-Shen Construction made applications for BFA across a number of planning provisions and 
categories, accruing bonuses as a result of the application of particular design standards (e.g., 
environmental standards) and in return for constructing pedestrian footpaths and other public 
facilities and infrastructures and for making provision for the resettlement of informal settlers. This 
application was officially approved, with the effect of 50% legal FAR being added to the already 
raised statutory cap. Moreover, the redeveloper purchased offsets from the secondary TDR market. 
This enabled a transfer of 10,751.87 m2 from other districts onto the underlying site, equivalent to a 
further 39% of the legal FAR. In such processes of redevelopment in Zone 2, then, the constitutive 
role of urban air rights as mechanisms for the commodification and secondary marketization of the 







Figure 2. Bird’s-eye view of the Da-Chen Righteous Compatriot Community. 






However, Kei-Shen Construction also used the portfolio of air rights on Zone 2 as building credits 
in two main ways. First, and typical of the mobilization of urban air rights as building credits in 
Taipei, the residents’ properties will be equally converted into the renewed condominium unit, which 
is 5.1 times as big as their original legal possession. The project manager of Kei-Shen Construction 
explained: ‘while residential towers are rather costly and generally inaccessible for residents who 
are social–economic minorities, a majority of the residents choose to increase their usable space by 
adding makeshift alterations without official approval’.3 Instead, the mobilization of urban air rights 
is presently an exceptional offer for these middle- and low-income households because the 
volumetric growth could transcend their existing asset thresholds, reorient the rights to rehousing 
towards future benefits and/or financial inclusion. Second, in a twist on the typical mobilization of 
urban air rights as building cred- its, urban air rights were crucial to raising the syndicated loan from 
seven banks to Kei-Shen Construction that financed the redevelopment of Zone 2, without further 
need for physical collateral. In this case, the portfolio of air rights further hinges the marketization 
of the urban sky onto the process of capitalization, making air rights capitalized assets. 
 
Extensively, air rights as market devices had been employed in the scheme of redistribution and 
sorted and diversified residents’ positions and judgements. For instance, the local tenants who have 
no residual claim were left uncounted. This is because tenancy is assessed as invalid for resettlement 
or compensation under the air rights regime. Having a proprietary ownership, nonetheless, does not 
always privilege the right to rehousing or the access to the residual claims of the development-based 
joint venture. In this case, there were 23 property owners whose property values were too small to 
be converted into a basic unit after renewal and were thus categorized as ineligible for residual 
                                                     
3 Semi-structured interview with the redeveloper of Da- Chen Community, January 4, 2017. The rule of thumb in such 
underwriting processes still requires a certain amount of collateral from the lender. 
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claims. For these owners, the alternatives are either to combine several people’s property shares to 
exchange a unit or to receive the cash compensation from the redeveloper upon appraisal of the 
existing estate value. Moreover, a radical change introduced by the air rights regime is that of BFA 
for resettlement. The BFA for resettlement grants the redeveloper building credits to resettle informal 
settlers upon his/her deliberative choice. Selected informal settlers whose status qualified them to 
exchange such building credits (i.e., long-term residential record) will be resettled on-site and 
permitted ‘right-to-buy’ on offer of the construction cost. In this way, the rights to rehousing have 
been made equivalent to access to property ownership with the rendering of the logic of 
creditworthiness. Last, property owners who secure their rights to rehousing and residual claims are 
obligated to share the expense, which accounts for 54.45% of the cost of the redevelopment project. 
Instead of requiring residents to pay off the lump-sum project expense by cash, eligible shareholders 
are expected to repay by giving out this percentage of their land ownership to the redeveloper. To 
this end, the assembled portfolio of air rights is not merely the cheaper alternatives for developing 
private urban land parcels, but a pseudo-debt claim that works the other way around as the means for 
the redeveloper to acquire a significant share of land ownership of the project site.4 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
This paper explored the conception of urban air rights as market devices and how this helps to 
elucidate the financialization imbued in urban processes. It explained how air rights as market devices 
could be a method to map out urban financialization in Asian cities and beyond. Specifically, urban 
air rights make visible the connections across diverse market-based policy instruments and their wide 
                                                     
4 Confidential interviews with a focus group comprised of six local residents from Da-Chen Community, November 7, 
2015. The economic incentives staged by the air rights regime were not complementary to reaching the residents’ agreements. 
During spring 2015, there were 10–20 remaining households who rejected the redistribution scheme. While this case was 
acclaimed to be paradigmatic for its achievement of a 100% agreement, what underlay the process was a series of crackdowns 
on and demolitions of unapproved buildings launched in the adjacent Taipei City that affects the recalcitrant owners either 
to opt out or to agree to join. 
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applications in development finance. As such, understanding air rights as market devices makes 
legible the ways in which urban airspace are not merely a spatial unit for planning instruments but 
also operate in manifold related market-making processes, including primary and secondary 
marketization and financialization that can potentially evolve into models of debt or equity finance. 
Market devices show air rights’ capacity as objects with agency. This is unfolded through three forms 
of building credits: bonus, offset and permit. These air rights, either bundled together or stand-alone, 
work beyond sites of redevelopment and are entrenched in market practices as credits. 
 
Owing to space restrictions, this paper offers a relatively limited sketch of the market practices of 
air rights instrument. However, it extends to three concluding points. First, this paper introduces 
urban air rights as a novel empirical terrain for geographical research – a parameter for comparing 
across diverse planning and regulatory contexts. To abstract floor area ratio and plot ratio into air 
rights is not only an act of rephrasing but also enables translation across different urban domains. 
Also, the conceptual efficacy lies in its de-naturalization of the production of vertical sprawl. 
 
Second, in responding to the special issue’s theme on financialization in Asia, this paper contributes 
to the conception of air rights as market devices. This offers a middle-level analytical tool composed 
of both economic mechanisms and legal–economic forms and allows further exploration of the 
urban–finance nexus to capture movements and dynamics of financial reformulation within urban 
governance. For instance, this paper has reconfigured the facilitation of urban financialization through 
three cognate and tightly knit threads of urban processes: market- making, policy-making and asset-
making. These findings have brought significant implications for understanding how relations 
between public and private urban finance are restructured (as shown in the case study of the subway 
system). Moreover, they advance a relational reading to understand the socio-technical deployment 




Third, this paper unlocks the analytical potential to urban regions that are less invested with global 
capital and yet speculative. While TMA is not the typical global locus for financial investments, this 
paper has uncovered the underlying transformations of the grounded socio- spatial practices such 
that the constant (un)making of financialization can be observed. With the exemplars of both 
infrastructure provision and urban renewal, this paper points out the potential of researching the 
relation- ships of diverse urban domains and refiguring the dynamics of urban financialization by 
tracking air rights’ socio-technical workings. 
 
To conclude, this paper serves as an initial navigation of urban air rights and how their workings stitch 
the urban– finance nexus. Highlighting their socio-technical workings is thus a geographical critique 
of value capture tools and, more broadly, makes explicit that urban financialization could be 
reconsidered through the combination of existing and manifold marketization processes. 
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